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Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA)
brigade level behavior during the Northern Ireland Conflict (1970-1998) and iden-
tifies the organizational factors that impact a brigade’s lethality as measured via
terrorist attacks. Key independent variables include levels of technical expertise,
cadre age, counter-terrorism policies experienced, brigade size, and IED compo-
nents and delivery methods. We find that technical expertise within a brigade allows
for careful IED usage, which significantly minimizes civilian casualties (a specific
strategic goal of PIRA) while increasing the ability to kill more high value targets with
IEDs. Lethal counter-terrorism events also significantly affect a brigade’s likelihood
of killing both civilians and high-value targets but in different ways. Killing PIRA
members significantly decreases IED fatalities but also significantly decreases the
possibility of zero civilian IED-related deaths in a given year. Killing innocent
Catholics in a Brigade’s county significantly increases total and civilian IED fatalities.
Together the results suggest the necessity to analyze dynamic situational variables
that impact terrorist group behavior at the sub-unit level.
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There is substantial evidence that, on average, terrorist organizations that are
more capable and have more access to resources and information will be more
lethal. Conversely, those that lack such abilities are likely to perform less well
when they try to kill (Drake 1998a; Asal and Rethemeyer 2008b, 2008c). These
generalizations, while true for the aggregate, obscure the fact that different orga-
nizations do not always use their expertise to kill. Terrorist organizations engage
in a wide variety of functional behaviors, not all of which are directly related to
efforts to kill or cause destruction. Some organizations specifically plan attacks
so that they are likely to kill no one (Taylor 1998; Ackerman 2003; Earth Lib-
eration Front 2006). To effectively identify what specific factors affect organi-
zational strategies, it is important to look inside organizations and identify those
factors that push a specific organization to be lethal, not to be lethal, and per-
haps most importantly to be selectively lethal. While there is a great deal of case
study research on terrorist organizations, most of this work is qualitative in
nature and is focused on situational factors that limit generalization (Drake
1991; Ross 1995; David 2003).
Another key limitation of the current literature is a tremendous focus in the last
decade on Islamist organizations (Whine 1999; Israeli 2002; Jones, Smith, and
Weeding 2003; Lia and Hegghammer 2004; Zahab and Roy 2004; Sageman 2004,
2008; Dalacoura 2006). While the Islamist terrorist threat is an important and obvi-
ous current concern, it is not the only type of ideology associated with terrorism.
Also, the religious ideology that drives Islamist political violence is likely to create
different factors that affect the lethality of the organizations under investigation
(Asal and Rethemeyer 2008c). Specifically, Asal and Rethemeyer found that reli-
gious organizations are much more likely to be lethal than nonreligious organiza-
tions—which during the period they study is referring primarily to Islamist
organizations (Horowitz and Potter 2013; Asal and Rethemeyer 2008a) and that cer-
tain other organizations (like environmental organizations) actively try to avoid kill-
ing (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008a). In addition to broadening the literature beyond a
focus on Islamist terrorism, our efforts to examine the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (PIRA) specifically allow us to tease out the internal organizational-level fac-
tors that moderate or increase the likelihood that an organization will be lethal, how
lethal they will be, and who they are likely to target. The ability to gain some traction
on the choice of targets—be they military or civilian—is also important given the
divergence in the literature that exists on what terrorism actually means and how
violent organizations differ (Schmid 1988; Schmid and Jongman 2005; Goodwin
2006). There is a huge normative argument about the utility of the term terrorist
organization and how it should be applied (Schmid 1988; Schmid and Jongman
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2005), with some saying the term is pointless (or used to normatively to delegitimize
your opponents), while others see it as a powerful normative tool to identify those
that are purposively targeting civilians on purpose (Chomsky 2002; Coady 2004).
Although the normative aspect of targeting is not the primary focus of our research
here, our analysis does allow us to shed some light (within one organization at least)
on factors that impact how an organization makes targeting choices.1
Our effort here is to disaggregate the efforts of one terrorist organization, PIRA,
across geographic operational domains. We focus specifically at the factors that
make improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and shooting attacks more or less lethal
within a given geographic territory within a given year. IED types, brigade experi-
ence, size, and experiences of counterterrorism (CT) should all have an effect, but
we believe the impact of these explanatory variables will differ in important ways.
Although structural aspects (such as ideology) of a conflict matter, explanations of a
terrorist organization’s lethality rates at the local level are rooted in dynamic situa-
tional variables. Through understanding which types of dynamic variables matter, it
may provide policy makers and practitioners with an empirically informed under-
standing of what environmental factors influence the tempo and trajectory of violent
terrorist campaigns and what subunit traits matter for threat assessments at the group
level. However, we should also note at the outset the advantages and disadvantages
of our particular focus on PIRA activity. By focusing on one specific organization
over an extended time, we were able to gather a great deal of quantitative intraorga-
nizational data that we were able to use to tease out the relative importance of orga-
nizational capabilities and the organizational action/state reaction cycle. At the same
time, it is important to be modest in our claims: this analysis is for only one organi-
zation (prominent as it has been in the history of twentieth-century terrorism), and
thus, we need to be careful drawing conclusions that are too broad in scope. We see
this analysis as a first quantitative step in better understanding the internal factors
that impact an organization’s lethality across space and time.
The Northern Ireland Conflict
This study focuses upon the ethnopolitical conflict in Northern Ireland from 1970 to
1998. Although a number of Republican militant groups were active in this time,
including the Official Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Irish National Liberation
Army, the Continuity IRA, the Real IRA, and the Irish People’s Liberation Organi-
zation, we narrow our focus solely to PIRA. PIRA were the most prolific nonstate
militant grouping during this period in terms of both terrorist events and fatalities
caused. Through a protracted campaign of violence, PIRA’s overall objective was
to force the removal of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom, thereby
paving the way for the reestablishment of a thirty-two county Republic of Ireland.
Following a split in the Republican movement in December 1969, PIRA was
formed. Originally, PIRA strategy sought to quickly force British troops out of
Northern Ireland by inflicting a high death toll and substantial economic costs and
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thereby swaying British public opinion against maintaining an active presence in
Northern Ireland. By 1977, PIRA’s plans became more long term, and they started
plotting a longer war of attrition that eventually led to an increased emphasis upon
mainstream political mobilization through their political wing, Sinn Fe´in. In the
years that followed, the Republican movement came to embrace what it internally
referred to as Tactical Use of the Armed Struggle. Its attacks would become increas-
ingly discriminate, surgical, and strategically oriented.
PIRA were active for twenty-nine years and had a long time to get very good at
killing people. Even if we only trace the development of skills and ties that could
be exploited to target their enemies from the birth of PIRA in 1970 following state
violence against protestors demanding civil rights (Moloney 2003), by 1979 the
organization had ten years of active and successful practice (Sutton 1994). That year,
PIRA operatives detonated a concealed trailer full of milk churns that had been
packed with 227 kg of ammonium nitrate explosives as a convoy of five British
Army vehicles passed. Revealing a great deal of malevolent creativity, the trailer had
been surrounded by petrol cans that further enhanced the explosion’s ferocity
(Oppenheimer 2009, 113). This detonation blew up the second truck in the convoy,
killing six soldiers of the Parachute Regiment that had been responsible for the
Bloody Sunday massacre that killed thirteen innocent civil rights marchers seven
years prior. Immediately, PIRA snipers fired on the rest of the convoy. The surviving
soldiers sought cover behind the gates of a nearby gatehouse. Anticipating this
retreat ahead of time, PIRA had already placed an even larger 450-kg IED using a
homemade mixture of ammonium nitrate, nitroglycerine, and coal. Upon additional
rescue teams arriving to save the retreating survivors, PIRA operatives detonated the
second bomb using a remote control trigger, killing a further twelve soldiers (Oppen-
heimer 2009, 113-14).
Such examples however mask the fact that a large proportion of PIRA’s acts of
violence caused zero fatalities. For example, of the 5,461 PIRA IEDs, we coded as
part of the bigger data-driven project from which this article draws (‘‘From Bomb to
Bomb-Maker’’), only 8.7 percent killed at least one person (on many occasions at the
beginning of the conflict, the sole victim was the IED planter who died due to a
premature explosion—such incidents are not counted in the following analyses). The
relatively discriminative impression these results produce are a reflection of PIRA’s
strategy of aiming to limit civilian deaths (through the provision of advanced
warnings), bombing economic targets in the middle of the night, and increasing the
economic costs of the United Kingdom’s continued presence within Northern
Ireland.
Our analysis focuses largely upon PIRA’s IED usage. We define an explosive
device as an IED if any or all of the following are modified in any respect from its
original expressed or intended function: explosive ingredient, initiation, triggering
or detonation mechanism, delivery system. IED components can incorporate
military grade munitions, commercial explosives, or homemade explosives. An
explosive device is not considered an IED when ‘‘no aspect of its deployment or
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fabrication is innovated’’ upon (Gill, Horgan, and Lovelace, 2011, 742). PIRA’s use
of Soviet-manufactured rocket-propelled grenades called RPG-7s was not included
in our analysis.
As Figures 1 through 3 illustrate, PIRA’s use of IEDs ebbed and flowed over the
course of its twenty-nine-year conflict. The biggest spike occurred over the opening
two years as violence on both sides reached its peak. During this time, PIRA’s use of
Figure 1. PIRA IED events across time.
Note: PIRA ¼ Provisional Irish Republican Army; IED ¼ improvised explosive device.
Figure 2. Attacks, fatalities, and injuries, by period.
Asal et al. 405
 at University College London on April 29, 2015jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
car bombs dramatically accelerated upon developing ammonium nitrate explosives
requiring a delivery system capable of carrying hundreds of kilos of the mixture.
The subsequent dip from 1972 to 1975 is largely attributable to British counterter-
rorism policy of blocking off PIRA’s supply of commercial explosives (which
were largely obtained through mining companies and robberies south of the bor-
der). Also, PIRA’s strategy of a quick military victory began to give way to a strat-
egy based on a war of attrition. As such, the scale and intensity of IED attacks
began to decrease in lethality but increased in frequency through the late 1970s
as PIRA began to regularly use small, timer-based incendiary devices against com-
mercial business premises. The idea behind these attacks was to minimize the pos-
sibility of civilian casualties by timing the ignition in the middle of the night but
still to allow for maximum economic damage. PIRA hoped that the increasing
costs of maintaining a visible British presence in Northern Ireland would ulti-
mately tempt British voters to pressurize incumbent regimes to withdraw political
and territorial interest from Northern Ireland. The growing politicization of the
Republican movement through the 1980s accompanied a perceived downgrading
in PIRA’s ability to consistently engage in fatal attacks (Moloney 2010). Interest-
ingly, while private negotiations for peace with the British (between 1990 and
1994) were at their peak, PIRA’s use of IEDs gradually rose with 1993 experien-
cing the fourth-highest number of IED events in any given year of the conflict. In
effect, PIRA had learned from previous negotiations that the only way to
strengthen their position at the bargaining table while keeping active supporters
and rank and file recruits happy was to gradually step up their violent (but not
necessarily fatal) activities. The ability of PIRA to ‘‘turn . . . bombing[s] on and off
like a tap’’ came to represent one of their signature capabilities throughout both
formal and informal negotiations (Coogan 2002, 399).
Figure 3. Mean fatalities and injuries per attack.
406 Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(3)
 at University College London on April 29, 2015jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
The remaining figures in this section disaggregate PIRA’s campaign into five
discrete phases of activity. Our intention is to illustrate how organizational changes
in structure and strategy impact the trajectory of violent events, types of events typi-
cally engaged upon, and their outcomes. The first phase is from 1969 to 1976. Dur-
ing this period, PIRA structured themselves like an army composed of various
brigades, battalions, and companies. Each unit was responsible for specific geogra-
phical areas of operation, both combat and noncombat related. Indiscriminate vio-
lence by both sides of the conflict marked this period, the most defining moment
being ‘‘Bloody Sunday’’ when the British Army shot and killed thirteen innocent
civil rights marchers. This was an unprecedented propaganda coup for PIRA and led
to mass recruitment and mobilization. Civilian fatalities attributed to PIRA also
peaked during this phase and included the events of ‘‘Bloody Friday’’ where, in
under two hours, 22 IEDs killed 9 (6 civilians, 2 British Soldiers, and 1 Ulster
Defence Association member) and injured a further 130.
The second phase, from 1977 to 1980, is significant for a number of reasons.
First, there was a large-scale reorganization of PIRA’s structure to a tighter cellular
based network in which cells acted independently of one another. This change
placed far less emphasis on the quantity of volunteers and far more emphasis
on secrecy and discipline. Almost instantly, the effects of the structural changes
were noticeable. Four hundred sixty-five fewer charges for paramilitary offences
occurred within a year (Smith, 1997, 145). Second, a number of leadership
changes occurred whereby younger Northern born-and-bred members (such as
Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness) became PIRA chiefs of staff in the late
1970s (Moloney 2003, 513).
The third phase covered the period from 1981 to 1989 and encompasses the grow-
ing politicization of the Republican movement that occurred after the Hunger
Strikes. In total, ten Republicans died during hunger strikes in 1981; seven were
PIRA members. Additionally, PIRA’s Bobby Sands was elected to Westminster
after winning a by-election while on a hunger strike. Sympathy for PIRA began
to rise again, and this was largely channeled toward PIRA’s political wing, Sinn
Fein, by organizational elites.
Phase 4 (1990–1994) includes the negotiations and pathway toward ceasefires
undertaken secretly by organizational elites. Much of this was carried on unbe-
knownst to the wider cadre. Phase 5 (1995–1998) incorporates the period in which
the negotiations were made public and the march toward the final ceasefire and
Good Friday Agreement that symbolized for many the end of the Northern Ireland
conflict.
Figure 2 neatly illustrates the substantial drop in the numbers of fatalities and
injuries through PIRA’s IED activity across time. Phase 1 averages 70.57 fatalities
a year, while the figures for phases 2 through 5 are 28, 32.5, 20.8, and 4.125,
respectively.
However, Figure 3 illustrates that when calculated as a ratio, the average number
of injuries attributed to PIRA IEDs increases in the final phases of the conflict.
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Theory
One of the major findings in the quantitative analysis of the lethality of terrorist
organizations is that organizational factors do indeed matter (Asal and Rethemeyer
2008c). Asal and Rethemeyer found that organizational size, connections, and ideol-
ogy all had a significant impact on the lethality of terrorist organizations. However,
their analysis reflects an aggregate cross-organizational perspective focusing upon a
wide array of ideologies and does not take differences in tactics into account. What
may be true of organizations in the aggregate may not be true if we disaggregate
organizations (Helfstein and Wright 2011). One confounding factor may be that
ideological differences hide important differences at the suborganizational level.
Drake (1998a, 53) notes that ideology relates to targeting practices of terrorist orga-
nizations because ‘‘it sets out the moral framework within which they operate.’’
Similarly, a number of scholars note that the ‘‘new terrorist’’ organizations are more
lethal and attribute this difference in lethality to religious ideology: religious ideol-
ogies are in some cases ‘‘more permissive of violent and deadly acts’’ (Laqueur
1998).
Further, Asal and Rethemeyer (2008a, 438) argue that two factors shape how
intrinsically linked any ideology is to deadliness. The first point relates to whether
the organization’s audience is earthly or supernatural. The second point relates to an
organization’s ability to ‘‘clearly and cleanly define an ‘other.’’’ Ideology, however,
cannot explain divergences in lethality within a single organization. Within a terror-
ist organization, the ideology’s audience and ability to ‘‘other’’ the enemy remain
relatively constant (although it must be stated that components of PIRA were more
sectarian than others while some politicized earlier than others). The same is true for
other variables often labeled ‘‘root causes’’ of terrorism, such as rates of democracy
and state sponsorship (Helfstein and Wright 2011). The reasons for varying rates of
lethality within an organization must lay elsewhere. Our contention is that subunit
capability (conceptualized as unit size, levels of professional training, and experi-
ence) and blue team (e.g., those actors charged with countering terrorism such as the
military or police) activity combine to make particular forms of fatal violence more
likely within particular components of a terrorist organization.
When Smarter Is Better than Bigger: Human Capital
The social movement literature has long established that resources are key to the
success of organizations (McCarthy and Zald 1977) and the lack of resources has
been seen to limit what terrorist organizations can do (Boyns and Ballard 2004).
Human capital is often depicted as the key resource (Boyns and Ballard 2004; Asal
and Rethemeyer 2008c). Jackson points out that larger terrorist organizations should
be better at adopting and making effective use of new technologies (Jackson 2001).
All else being equal we would expect larger organizations to be more lethal.
Contrary to Jackson (2001), Oots (1986, 69-72) makes the case that when it comes
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to carrying out attacks, larger organizational structures are likely to be less effective
because they require resources to maintain them. McCormick (2003) makes a sim-
ilar argument about the tensions between an organization trying to protect itself
while still trying to carry out its attacks.
These arguments treat terrorist organizations as single entities and do not exam-
ine them as coexisting subunits. While we can measure terrorist attack counts by
whole organizations, if the organization is big enough it is misleading to say that
an attack is conducted by an entire organization. Thus, when we look at a terrorist
organization’s component parts the logic may be different than for the organization
as a whole. In the case of PIRA, attacks were carried out by different brigades (who
themselves had specialized roles and responsibilities) and rarely as attacks orche-
strated by the organization as a whole (Horgan and Taylor 1997). Indeed, PIRA’s
claims of responsibility often attributed attacks to particular brigades or battalions.
Another possibility to consider is that the size of an organizational component
will have a differential impact depending on the type of attack that is carried out.
The level of expertise that a type of attack demands should have an impact on how
human resources impact the success of that kind of attack (Jackson 2009, 12-13).
The level of technical expertise needed for an average shooting attack for example
could be considered low—so the impact of having more people with technical skills
should be minimal. On the other hand, complex attacks demand a higher level of
organization, expertise, and security (if you assume that complex attacks have
the potential to be more spectacular in their consequences; Drake 1998a, 1998b;
Jackson 2009, 12-13). Firsthand accounts of PIRA training suggest that a
disproportionate amount of time was spent on IED training compared to shooting
(see O’Callaghan 1999), which leads us to suggest that IEDs are generally more
complex than shooting attacks and their successful execution depends more on
knowledge at the individual bomb maker and his or her network affiliates’ level.
Further to this, Johnson and Braithwaite (2009) illustrate that IED attacks form
tighter space-time clusters than do non-IED events, which indicates that IED attacks
involve more planning, training, materials, expertise, and local support.
Knowledge at the individual level, rather than group size, may therefore be a
more important factor for determining the effectiveness of IEDs compared to shoot-
ing attacks. In fact, complex attacks have the potential to be more spectacular in their
consequences, and certainly are more likely to portray the group responsible as more
sophisticated with the ability to coordinate multiple, simultaneous efforts. However,
group size also matters. On one hand, the larger the group, the more likely a group is
to have in its ranks an individual with the requisite knowledge to build a sophisti-
cated IED. On the other hand, larger groups are more likely to leak information to
counterterrorism agencies and thus increase the chances of early detection. On bal-
ance, we believe the relationship is likely to be in favor of larger groups: larger
groups contain more knowledge, and more knowledge leads to greater success.
Thus, group size and total knowledge should be related positively to one another
from this perspective.
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Separate from the knowledge argument is one based in experience. Asal and
Rethemeyer (2008a) have found that lack of experience reduces lethality in their
cross-national study, as has Jackson (2001; though Jackson used the age of the
organization as a proxy). As Hoffman (1999, 25) argues, ‘‘An almost Darwinian
principle of natural selection . . . seems to affect terrorist organizations, whereby
every new terrorist generation learns from its predecessors . . .Terrorists often ana-
lyze the mistakes made by former comrades who have been killed or apprehended.’’
Thus, we expect that having more experienced cadre in a brigade should also allow
for an organization to be more effective in its use of IEDs. Given the relative lack of
sophistication needed to perpetrate shooting attacks, the same should not hold true
for such attacks at the brigade level.
Human capital can also be measured in outputs and not just inner traits such as
experience and technical expertise. Not all IEDs and their constituent initiation sys-
tems are created equally, with some being more difficult than others.2 Similarly, not
all target types are equal. High-value targets such as military personnel, military
infrastructure, police, or politicians are far more target hardened than most areas
heavily frequented by civilian populations. While attacks against high-value targets
may have a much higher pay off if they succeed, attacks that are easier (in both their
deployment and who they target) should be more successful on average (Jackson
2009; Drake 1998a, 1998b). In other words, when a brigade tries to carry off an attack
using a device that is harder to construct the likelihood of success should fall. By the
same token, brigades intent on using an IED (as opposed to opting for a shooting attack
with multiple offenders) to attack a hardened target are more likely to fail but also need
a more sophisticated device to succeed. Organizational decision makers are therefore
constrained when choosing attack types and targets. Having limited resources (i.e.,
IED components and personnel), decision makers must choose between attacking soft
or hard targets using complex or simple IEDs and IED components. Given the relative
ease of attacking civilians, simple IEDs are likely to be chosen. Given the relative dif-
ficulty of attacking high-value targets, multifaceted IEDs and complex attacks (defined
as attacks involved more than one attack type) are more likely to be chosen despite the
higher chance of failure. While the most lethal attacks are likely to be complex ones
targeting civilians, there are fewer incentives to use such tactics given the fact that sim-
pler means can also cause a great deal of death and destruction against weakly guarded
targets (Dolnik and Bhattacharjee 2002).
We derive the following hypotheses from this discussion:
Hypothesis 1: Larger brigades should kill more.
Hypothesis 2: Brigades with more knowledge (measured as age and training)
should kill more people with IED attacks.
Hypothesis 3: Brigades with more knowledge (measured as age and training)
should kill fewer people with shooting attacks.
Hypothesis 4: Complex attacks should kill more than simple attacks.
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The Impact of Counterterrorism
Counterterrorism efforts are designed to impact how terrorists behave. Yet, whether
and how this precisely happens is often less than clear. A report from 2006 found that
(1) very little rigorous empirical research exists, (2) what does exist provides little
support for most common policies, and (3) the one policy that does seem to have
an effect works in the wrong direction: retaliatory raids increased terrorism (Lum,
Kennedy, and Sherley 2006). More recent work focusing on particular cases or
surveys of the literature has found either a complicated picture or a nonproductive:
counterterrorism activities are ineffective or counterproductive (Duyvesteyn 2008;
Feridun and Shahbaz 2010; Fielding and Shortland 2010). An analysis of PIRA ter-
rorism found that most counterterrorist efforts resulted in an increase in terrorist activ-
ity and thereby could be characterized by a ‘‘backlash’’ model of counterterrorism
(LaFree, Dugan, and Korte 2009). We should note that due to a specific interest in the
impact of discriminate (e.g., the killing of PIRA members) versus indiscriminate (e.g.,
the killing of Catholic noncombatants) violence our focus here is on proactive offen-
sive state attacks and not on other types of repression that are not specifically violent in
nature like situational crime prevention measures such as checkpoints and curfews or
judicial deterrence measures such as punitive sentencing.
Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2010) suggest an important distinction when it
comes to counterterrorism. They found that targeted house demolitions that
destroyed the homes of people engaged in suicide terrorism reduced suicide attacks,
while house demolitions that were carried out against property not directly
associated with the specific suicide attack increased subsequent terrorism. Byman,
examining Israel’s policies of targeted killing found that such assassinations reduced
the effectiveness of Hamas terrorism against Israel (Byman 2006), although others
have found no effect (Hafez and Hatfield 2006). The Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor
(2010) and LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) articles both suggest that counterterror-
ism actions can create a backlash. Benmelech et al. and Byman’s articles introduce
an interesting and potentially very important caveat. While we can assume that both
kinds of attacks are likely to hurt the brigade, indiscriminate attacks compensate for
this pain by making the group more popular and creating more support. McCauley
and Moskalenko (2008) argue that this is exactly one of the reasons why terrorist
organizations stage attacks: attacks provoke repression and make terrorist organiza-
tions more popular and stronger—something they label Jujitsu Politics (a term first
coined by Sharp [1965] in the context of nonviolent conflict resolution). On the other
hand, violence directed specifically at the organization appears to lower the amount
of subsequent terrorism. We derive the following hypotheses from this discussion:
Hypothesis 5: Indiscriminate counterterrorism killings should increase the
number of people killed by IEDs and shootings.
Hypothesis 6: Discriminate counterterrorism killings should reduce the num-
ber of people killed by IEDs and shootings.
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Data
The data are an aggregation of 5,461 PIRA IED events, all fatal PIRA shootings, and
the sociodemographic and operational behaviors of 1,240 PIRAmembers for the years
1970 to 1998. Similar to many quantitative studies of terrorism and political violence,
there exist a number of data constraints in this study. However, after an eighteen-
month data collection effort across multiple data sources, we feel that this is the best
data available. From a research perspective, focusing upon intraorganizational
dynamics allows us to hold constant many of the environmental and systemic
variables that may confound other studies.
For this article, PIRA is disaggregated into six discrete subunits, each of which
encompasses a county of Northern Ireland. Although not an exact fit to PIRA’s com-
mand and functional structure, it acts as the only realizable proxy measure. PIRA
was largely structured along geographic lines in a number of ways. First, PIRA was
split into two command areas: southern and northern. Northern Command includes
both the six counties of Northern Ireland and the border counties of Cavan, Donegal,
Leitrim, Louth, and Monaghan. Northern Command therefore covered the main
theater of conflict. In turn, Northern Command was composed of brigadiers, bri-
gades, operations commanders, and active service units of typically four individual
PIRA members. Southern Command constituted the other twenty-one counties of
the Republic of Ireland and its duties largely encompassed logistical support for
Northern Command activities. Tasks included training, funding, storing, and moving
arms as well as provision of safehouses (Horgan and Taylor 1997). Often, active ser-
vice units (ASUs) operated within their own locality (Horgan and Taylor 1997, 20).
White and White’s (1991) interviews with former senior PIRA figures explain why.
‘‘Reasons for this would be to avail of local facilities before, during and after oper-
ations, such as safehouses where they would be recognized without difficulty, and
also because of familiarity with the operational area (a vital aspect of the operational
‘cycle’—target selection, planning, escape routes, etc.). Perhaps, however, this may
be seen to have a detrimental effect on the internal security of ASUs—after all, it is
far more difficult being required not to know the identity of one’s ASU colleague if,
in fact, Volunteers are operating in their ‘own’ locality’’ (Horgan and Taylor, 1997,
22). When questioned what makes a successful member of PIRA, Sean MacStiofain
(a former member of PIRA Chief of Staff), noted that ‘‘A person has got to be from
the locality, right? . . .He’s got to be respected within his own community, right? So
therefore he has the protection of the community. Like he becomes a fish who can
swim . . .He has got to have an intimate knowledge of his—the areas he’s going to
operate in. He has got to be considerate about the needs of his own community’’
(White and White 1991, 107).
The prime location of PIRA violence occurred within the six counties of Northern
Ireland. For this study, we aggregated yearly counts of aspects of IED usage, fatal
PIRA shooting events, fatal counterterrorism events, and a database of convicted
PIRA members for each county. While PIRA’s repertoires of violence also
412 Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(3)
 at University College London on April 29, 2015jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
incorporated punishment beatings, kidnappings, and bank robberies, we specifically
focus upon aggregate counts of IEDs and shootings because they were the tactics
most associated with lethal forms of violence. In total, there are 174 observations
(6 counties  29 years). Each observation contains yearly counts of the IEDs deto-
nated as intended or were ‘‘duds.’’ We also count the number of each of the
following: initiations systems used within a county in a given year: timer-
initiated, wire-initiated, remote-initiated, projectile-initiated, booby trap–initiated,
impact-initiated, and victim-initiated devices. Counts of the following IED types
were also included in the analysis: letter bombs, pipe bombs, grenades, homemade
bombs, static munitions, buried IEDs, undervehicle IEDs, car bombs, mortars, and
rockets. We also tallied the number of complex IED events. We defined complex
IED events as those where the IED was used in conjunction with another types of
violent event such as machine gun fire or sniper fire.
Our metric of counterterrorism activity is a count of the PIRA members and
innocent Catholics killed by the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
It should be noted that these two counts do not reflect the whole counterterrorism
picture. Policies such as internment did not directly cause fatalities but caused a later
backlash from the Catholic community and ultimately increased PIRA’s ability to
recruit new individuals and mobilize mass support. On the other hand, prison-
related policy changes such as the withdrawal of the Special Category Status even-
tually led to the 1981 Hunger Strikes in which seven PIRA and three Irish National
Liberation Army members died. When counterterrorism policies indirectly lead to
the deaths of PIRA members (such as the Hunger Strikes) these deaths were not
counted in our analysis. Other counterterrorism policies and actions such as the use
of informants and the capture of bomb-making facilities would also impinge upon
PIRA’s ability to engage in lethal IED attacks, but such data were difficult to collect
in a systematic way.
Our data set included a set of PIRA subunit traits, including a count of members
in the Brigade each year; a measure of how big the subunit was in relation to the
other five units each year; the mean age of the subunits’ members; the proportion
of subunit members who possessed professional skills that could be applied to bomb
making; and the number of fatalities the subunit caused through IEDs and shootings
across target types (including civilians and high-value targets). High-value targets
encompass a collection of Northern Ireland security forces such as the British Army,
the Royal Ulster Constabulary (the Northern Ireland police force), the Ulster
Defence Regiment, and the Royal Irish Regiment as well as government officials
(both elected and unelected) and other political figures.
The aggregate measures for the IED-related variables stem from a newly
constructed data set of 5,461 events collected as part of the ‘‘From Bomb to
Bomb-Maker’’ project. The data were collected through a mixture of LexisNexis and
Irish Times archival stories. The aggregate measures for deaths by the British Army
and other counterterrorism forces are collected through McKittrick et al.’s definitive
list of war dead from the Northern Ireland conflict. The subunit trait variables were
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aggregated by brigade from a database of 1,240 individuals who were either con-
victed of PIRA-related activities (including membership) or died on ‘‘active ser-
vice,’’ a term used by PIRA to describe a member’s involvement in PIRA-related
activities. For the purposes of the data collection, being engaged in ‘‘active service’’
included both violent activities (e.g. bombing attacks) and nonviolent activities (e.g.,
training accidents). The individuals were identified from a number of open sources:
(1) statements by PIRA including their annual Roll of Honor, which commemorates
their war dead; (2) the Belfast Graves publication that offers an account of Repub-
licans killed in combat; (3) McKittrick et al. mentioned earlier; and (4) historical
accounts of PIRA from academic sources. These names were subsequently coded for
a number of sociodemographic, operational, and network variables using the Irish
Times archives. Each piece of data (IED event, blue team activity, PIRA militant)
was coded twice by separate coders and cross-checked for validity.
Method
The unit of analysis is brigade-year. Four dependent variables were studied: total
fatalities, civilian fatalities, fatalities among high-value targets (such as security
forces, politicians, etc.), and fatalities from shootings. Each dependent variable is
a count of the fatalities attributed to each brigade during a year between 1970 and
1998.
Given that the dependent variables are counts generated by a rare event—deaths
from a terrorist attack—count models were employed. The data have two potential
issues that must be accommodated during technique selection: (1) there is evidence
of overdispersion of the dependent variable—in all four cases, the mean of the
counts is smaller than the standard deviation and (2) the presence of a large number
of zeros in the dependent variable (Long 1997; Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Long and
Freese 2003). Problem (1) suggests using a negative binomial model. However,
when we modeled the data using a zero-inflated negative binomial technique, the
coefficient on a, which captures the overdispersion, was not statistically significant
in three of the four models. In the one case where a was significant, the results were
not materially different from those generated by a Poisson model. For simplicity, we
have thus used a Poisson distribution for models reported below.
With respect to Problem (2), we compared the results from both the standard and
the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) models. The ZIP model incorporates a two-step deci-
sion process into the model assumptions. The decision whether to kill or not is sepa-
rated (analytically speaking) from the decision regarding how many people to kill.
ZIP allows for the possibility that zeros in the model are present because brigades
have chosen not to kill or because they were incapable of executing a fatal attack
during a given year. ZIP is attractive precisely because it can accommodate these
complexities in the data. In order to verify that the decisions are independent and
should be modeled simultaneously but independently, a Vuong (1989) test, which
compares the fit of the zero-inflated model to the standard negative binomial
414 Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(3)
 at University College London on April 29, 2015jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Table 1. Descriptive Analysis of Independent Variables.
Variable N M SD Minimum Maximum
Antrim 174 0.166667 0.373754 0 1
Armagh 174 0.166667 0.373754 0 1
Not a complex attack (1 ¼ no) 174 8.413793 8.323033 0 60
Complex attack (ct) 174 4.954023 7.149774 0 40
Detonated as intend 174 9.787356 10.74323 0 78
Count, IEDs that failed to detonate 174 0.563218 1.701418 0 16
Down 174 0.166667 0.373754 0 1
Phase 1 174 0.241379 0.429155 0 1
Phase 2 174 0.137931 0.345823 0 1
Phase 3 174 0.310345 0.46397 0 1
Phase 4 174 0.172414 0.37883 0 1
Phase 5 174 0.137931 0.345823 0 1
Killing by CT, PIRA members (ct) 174 0.954023 2.568858 0 25
Killings by CT, civilians (ct) 174 0.948276 3.1223 0 23
Fatalities, civilians 174 0.844828 2.251281 0 14
Fatalities, by shooting 174 5.172414 8.14352 0 74
Fatalities among targeted groups 174 1.465517 2.520773 0 18
Total fatalities 174 2.557471 3.863962 0 19
Fermanagh 174 0.166667 0.373754 0 1
IED type: Grenade 174 0.247126 0.655671 0 4
IED type: ‘‘homemade’’ 174 1.655172 2.969314 0 24
IED type: letter 174 0.218391 1.002024 0 11
IED type: mortar 174 1.362069 2.907226 0 19
IED type: rocket 174 0.08046 0.363617 0 3
Initiation type: booby trap 174 1.155172 1.803674 0 11
Initiation type: impact 174 1.413793 2.820453 0 14
Initiation type: Projectile 174 0.16092 1.257335 0 16
Initiation type: remote 174 0.316092 0.727713 0 5
Initiation type: timer 174 0.534483 1.105146 0 7
Londonderry 174 0.166667 0.373754 0 1
Member average age 168 25.84527 9.281119 0 50.28
Membership size (ct) 174 15.52299 20.42545 0 114
Number of members killed 174 1.45977 3.9088 0 44
Number of initiation types used 174 3.534483 2.094989 0 9
Number of IED types used 174 2.798851 1.594716 0 7
Relative size of brigade in PIRA 174 17.0008 18.28748 0 78.37
% of brigade professionally trained 173 15.80613 17.34554 0 100
Target: civilians 174 0.568966 1.049835 0 5
Target: military 174 1.672414 2.211802 0 11
Target: transportation 174 0.597701 1.637422 0 12
Tyrone 174 0.166667 0.373754 0 1
Note: PIRA ¼ Provisional Irish Republican Army; IED ¼ improvised explosive device.
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regression model, was executed and is reported in the results table. In all four mod-
els, the Vuong statistic clearly indicates that a zero-inflated model is superior.
In all four models, we attempted to include ‘‘phase’’ and brigade controls to
account for panel fixed effects. We also included controls for the mix of device and
initiation types used in IEDs over time, which could covary with our key training and
age variables. However, because some types of attacks were highly correlated with
brigade, phase, or type of attacks being modeled, the controls could not always be
included. Unlike other count models, there is no difference in ‘‘exposure’’—that
is, length of time over which the count would be accumulated—so there are no con-
trols for exposure in these models.
Because there are clear reasons to believe there are commonalities across time in
the behaviors of brigades, we adjusted the standard errors for brigade-level cluster-
ing (Rogers 1993). The resulting standard errors trade some efficiency for greater
robustness.
All four models reported w2 tests that were statistically significant at p < .001.
That is, all models were better than a simple mean. Statistical significance of coeffi-
cients was measured at the 0.1 percent, 1 percent, and 5 percent levels, except as oth-
erwise noted.
Each of the four dependent variables was modeled independently, and the zero-
inflation and count components of the estimations were modeled using a selection of
variables that accorded to the understanding of factors that drove the respective
dependent variables. Across all four models, we also discovered that some variables
had to be deleted to cope with high collinearity or problems with convergence of the
model, and the IED-related controls are, of course, not included in the modeling of
shooting fatalities. Thus, the results tables include a large number of controls. The
central findings for each model revolve around a set of key variables—see the first
eight variables listed in both the count and zero-inflation components of the estima-
tions. These eight variables are the ones we were most interested in exploring. They
capture the role of training, participation in PIRA, counterterrorism activities by
British authorities, membership size, membership age, and number of members
killed during a given brigade-year. However, in our analysis, we point to some inter-
esting findings for each of the models that are not necessarily found across all four
estimations. See Table 1 for a descriptive analysis of each independent variable.
Analysis
Table 2 contains the estimated coefficients for the count component of the ZIP mod-
els for all four dependent variables.
Table 3 provides the zero-inflation estimation results plus standard model quality
statistics such as N, w2, log likelihood, and the Vuong statistics that pertain to the
entire model (count and zero inflation).
The block of eight key variables at the top of the count component of the analysis
tells an interesting story. Turning to Hypotheses 2 and 3 first, knowledge matters to
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fatalities, but not in the manner most expect and as we anticipated originally. The
variable % of brigade professionally trained is statistically significant and negative
for both total and civilian IED casualties and unrelated to high-value IED and shoot-
ing casualties. In fact, this variable is negative across all four models, though not
statistically significant in the models for IED high-value targets and fatalities for
shootings. In all cases, training kept the body count down rather than causing it to
go up. Note that when the relative size of a brigade as compared to the rest of PIRA’s
Northern Command brigades went up, the total fatalities count also went down.
Thus, Hypothesis 2 is contradicted fairly convincingly and there is no support for
Hypothesis 3 with respect to professional training.
Also contrary to expectations, brigade size does not tend to increase fatalities
uniformly across all attack types. Instead, the variable Membership size (ct) has
no effect on total IED fatalities and high-value target IED fatalities, a negative effect
on civilian IED fatalities, but a positive effect on shooting fatalities. Thus, Hypoth-
esis 1 is only supported in the narrow case of shooting fatalities.
The results from the zero-inflation component of the estimation further nuance
our findings. As the percentage of the brigade professionally trained (e.g., with train-
ing from professional occupations that can be turned to bomb making) increased, the
probability that a brigade would kill no one went down and the probability that no
members of the high-value target group (i.e., British security forces) also went down.
Stated another way, training made it more likely a brigade would kill a nonzero
number of people with IEDs and especially more likely that a nonzero number of
high-value targets would be killed with IEDs, but training did not drive up the
number particularly. Similarly, as brigade size increased, the probability that a
brigade would kill a nonzero number of civilians would increase—but again, mem-
bership size did not drive up the civilian body count. Instead, the effect of size was to
make it likely some civilians would be killed.
A complementary pattern emerged in the zero-inflation results for the Relative
size of brigade in PIRA variable. As size of the Brigade goes up in comparison to
the other Brigades in that year, the probability that the brigade killed nobody went
down, but the probability that the brigade killed no civilians went up. The relatively
larger brigades in the PIRA were more likely to kill a nonzero number of people in a
given year, but being large did not translate into a drive to maximize killing, as the
Relative size of brigade in PIRA variable in the count model demonstrated.
Finally, in Hypotheses 2 and 3, we suggested that age and/or professional training
could be an important factor in driving IED fatalities. In fact, member average age
was not a factor here (in either the count or the zero-inflation components), meaning
that maturity and/or experience in the movement seemed to have little effect on
fatality rates one way or the other. Of our two hypothesized human capital factors,
training was the dominant factor.
The upshot of this complex set of outcomes is that professional training and size
create a capability for killing. As brigades become larger and more professionally
trained, the likelihood that this instrument will be used for some killing increases.
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However, size and training does not lead inexorably to prolific killing with IEDs or
shooting attacks. Instead, it appears that professional training may allow brigades to
kill those people they wish to kill rather than to kill indiscriminately. The question is
why PIRA killing was professionally modulated. If the capability existed, why not
use it more often?
The answer lies in the strategic choices of PIRA. PIRA was more generally
committed to selected killings—especially ofBritish security forces—rather than indis-
criminate lethality. AsAsal and Rethemeyer (2008a) found in their cross-national anal-
yses, organizations can shape their lethality. Looking cross-nationally between the
years 1998 and 2005, Asal and Rethemeyer found that organizations with a religious
ideology were more likely to kill prolifically, while organizations that had a combined
ideology of religion and ethnonationalismwere likely to kill evenmore.While an argu-
ment exists that the role of religionhas not beengiven enoughcredence in the analysis of
the Northern Ireland conflict (Mitchell 2005), there is a more widely held position that
religion merely differentiated Catholics and Protestants and acted as a proxy for what
were essentially ethnonational identities (McGarry and O’Leary 1995). Our theoretical
position largely concurs with the latter and our empirical analysis suggests that opera-
tional and ideological commitments helped to shape the impact of training—toward
focused, discriminate killing.
Hypothesis 4 addressed that nature of attacks: do complex attacks—attacks that
include both an IED and shooting component—increase the body count? Our anal-
ysis suggests that when the number of complex attacks attempted went up, there was
a particular pattern to fatalities (see the coefficients on Complex attack (ct)). Com-
plex attacks did not affect the total number of fatalities. However, complex attacks
tended to include a shooting component, so fatalities from shootings tended to
increase. Because such attacks involve additional terrorist actions (e.g., an IED
attack and a shooting attack), the civilian fatality count tended to increase, but the
fatality count among high-value target groups tended to decrease. Ambitious attacks
may be important for symbolic purposes and for recruiting, but the cost was a ten-
dency for brigades to move away from the general preference for targeted killing of
security personnel as outline above.
Turning now to counterterrorism effects (Hypotheses 5 and 6), there are strong
effects from the nature of British counterterrorism efforts. The data set contains
two counterterrorism variables: a count of PIRA members killed by British
forces (Killing by CT, PIRA members (ct)) and a count of Catholic civilian non-
combatants killed by British forces (Killings by CT, civilians (ct)). British killing
of PIRA members—what we term discriminate killing—had a rather straightfor-
ward effect on total fatalities—it decreased them—and had no relationship with
other fatality measures. With respect to total fatalities, Hypothesis 6 is supported.
However, there is one twist from the zero-inflation component of the model:
British killing of PIRA members tended to increase the probability that a brigade
would kill a nonzero number of civilians in that period. Thus, there is a two-step
explanation: killing PIRA members reduced effectiveness and tended to reduce
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total killings (per Hypothesis 6), but it made it more likely that a given brigade
would lash out in retaliation that would end up killing civilians, which is
more in line with the backlash models of Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2010) and
LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009). PIRA retaliation became less targeted on secu-
rity personnel as killing of PIRA members increased. A topic for future research is
to disentangle whether civilians were killed as a backlash or because the counter-
terrorism killings degraded the ‘‘quality’’ of PIRA members who were left, making
the overall organization unable to carry out discriminate violence.
Killing of civilians by counterterrorism forces—killings we term indiscrimi-
nate—had a quite different effect: it tended to increase total fatalities, civilian fatal-
ities, and fatalities from shootings, as anticipated in Hypothesis 5. The implication
from this finding is that killing of civilians by British counterterrorism authorities
seemed to engender a more violent, less targeted response. However, the zero-
inflation results also add a twist regarding counterterrorism activities. Killing of
civilians tended to make it more likely that a brigade would kill no one during a
given brigade year. So, we have contradictory results: British killing of civilians
made it more likely that a brigade would kill no civilians during a given year, but
if the brigade did kill civilians, it was likely to kill quite a few.
Drawing together these findings, this suggests that brigades may have acted like
capacitors: British killing of civilians would generate a desire to retaliate that was
held in check until a level of outrage was reached that triggered a response. Once
a response was triggered, it tended to be less planned and targeted than was the
general norm for brigade activity. Concurrent discriminate killing of PIRA members
could have exacerbated the tendency toward civilian killings in response by degrad-
ing the quality of members left such that a discriminate, security-focused response
became less possible. The zero-inflation results hint that brigades may have avoided
tit-for-tat killing of civilians, possibly because there was a fear of triggering a cycle
of violence. But the count component clearly indicates that civilian killings eventu-
ally sparked a more general, indiscriminate round of violence.
Conclusion
Violent terrorist acts culminate from a process of human social interaction and
organization. Often this process begins with underlying systemic causes and is often
sustained and driven by more proximate counterterrorism initiatives that feed the
recruitment and mobilization of new cadre. Within the cadre itself, individuals with
technical expertise may facilitate particular forms of violence that the group could
not engage in absence of this individual. The culmination of a terrorist attack is often
preceded by tactical decisions such as who should be targeted, what methods should
be used and in the case of an IED attack, what IED type and initiation system would
be most effective. All of these processes occur within groups and subgroups of vary-
ing sizes and we illustrated that variations across these processes impact a terrorist
organization’s deadliness.
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While the scale and intensity of terrorist campaigns is often related in the
literature to distal factors such as rates of poverty, unemployment, and democracy
indicators, there remains a distinct lack of awareness that not all violence is equal
in terms of the technical proficiency and psychological conditioning needed. Simi-
larly, not all IEDs are equal, and some aspects may drive lethality indicators up or
down dependent upon the prevailing strategic orientation of the terrorist group itself.
In other words, existing studies tend to aggregate terrorist organizations as collective
wholes and treat violent methods and fatality types homogeneously. Our findings
suggest that (1) rates of fatal attacks differ depending upon the type of oppressive
counterterrorism policies employed, (2) fatality rates differ intraorganizationally,
and finally (3) subunit variables such as membership age, professional technical
expertise, and brigade size also affect lethality rates but in different ways dependent
upon the type of violence, who is targeted, and the strategic choices the organization
makes corporately. There are caveats to these findings, not the least of which is that
our measures of CT activity are rather aggregated and cannot fully capture intelligence
interventions that reduce the number of attacks brought to fruition, thus also reducing
the total fatalities.3 This issue affects our finding that killing of PIRA members
reduces body counts. However, this issue does not affect the finding that killing of
civilians by counterterrorism forces leads to increased violence—if anything, our find-
ings underestimate the increase in fatalities after CT forces kill civilians.
Together, the results may help inform both policy and operational decision
making. At the policy level, the results show the negative impact likely to occur
when nonaligned civilians are killed in the course of counterterrorism operations.
Such events embolden terrorist organizations to strike back, usually in an equally
indiscriminate fashion. Even more so, the results suggest that when organizations
do decide to strike back in retaliation, it is likely to be at the local level, a finding
that Braithwaite and Johnson (2012) and Linke, Witmer, and O’Loughlin (2012)
also found in relation to insurgent activities in Iraq. Although the targeted killing
of PIRA members reduces a brigade’s ability to kill within a given year, there is
no data available to suggest whether such events also lead to an increase in constit-
uency support, and future recruits for the organization that may later breathe life into
a depleted subunit. Moreover, targeted killings may even have the perverse effect of
making civilian casualties more likely if the net result is to reduce the skill level of
the unit (though further research is needed to confirm this inference).
The results also suggest that although PIRA can be described as a coherent,
hierarchical organization, the variance among its subunits in terms of composition,
capabilities, and targeting policies requires nuanced counterterrorism policies—
policies that are tailored to the local subunit’s capacity for lethal activities. The results
also hold much promise for aggregate level risk assessment. While there has been
much theorizing about the structure of terrorist organizations, our results indicate
that perhaps we should be more concerned with the composition and qualities inher-
ent within a network of subunits. Those subunits with a higher number of individuals
with professional skills relevant to bomb making more often caused casualties, and
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those casualties are more likely to be among high-value targets rather than civilians.
Such findings may aid in decisions concerning what segments of a terrorist network
should be prioritized for immediate postevent investigation and intelligence
gathering.
Finally, we recognize that findings are not directly generalizable: we focused
here upon one terrorist organization. Generalizations to other groups may be
difficult to make. That said, we believe the logic behind the relationship between
counterterrorism killings and the lethality of units and subunits may apply more
broadly. Killing those whom the terrorist organization claims to represent is likely
to encourage retaliation in the form of indiscriminate violence against civilians for
a number of reasons elaborated upon above, whereas killing members of the group
is likely to lead (at least in the short run) to reductions in the group’s capacity to
striking back. In terms of subunit composition, generalizations are more difficult.
Higher levels of skilled bomb makers within PIRA brigades led to both a higher
likelihood of high-value targets being killed and civilians being spared—both of
which were long-standing strategic policies of PIRA. Not every terrorist organiza-
tion resembles PIRA in this regard, with many being far less reluctant to kill
civilians. We might therefore expect that the more technical expertise within any
given subunit in any terrorist organization, the closer that subunits fatality rates
will mirror the organization’s strategic logic as a whole.
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Notes
1. We thank our anonymous reviewers for pointing out this key issue related to the very use of
the term terrorism and the conundrums that any discussion of targeting cause.
2. The same is also true for shooting attacks. For example, a sniper would need more training
than a spree shooter. Despite this, we treat all shooting attacks equally for the purposes of
this study. Further coding effort is planned for future research endeavors to test whether
different factors help drive lethal and complex shootings versus lethal and noncomplex
shootings.
3. We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue.
Asal et al. 423
 at University College London on April 29, 2015jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
References
Ackerman, Gary A. 2003. ‘‘Beyond Arson? A Threat Assessment of the Earth Liberation
Front.’’ Terrorism & Political Violence 15 (4): 143-70.
Asal, Victor H., and R. Karl Rethemeyer. 2008a. ‘‘The Nature of the Beast: Organizational
Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks.’’ Journal of Politics 70 (2): 437-49.
Asal, Victor, and R. Karl Rethemeyer. 2008b. ‘‘Dilettantes, Ideologues, and the Weak:
Terrorists Who Don’t Kill.’’ Conflict Management and Peace Science 25 (3): 244-63.
Asal, Victor, and R. Karl Rethemeyer. 2008c. ‘‘The Nature of the Beast: Terrorist Organi-
zational Characteristics and Organizational Lethality.’’ Journal of Politics 70 (2):
437-49.
Benmelech, E., C. Berrebi, and E. Klor. 2010. Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from
House Demolitions. Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Boyns, David, and James David Ballard. 2004. ‘‘Developing a Sociological Theory for the
Empirical Understanding of Terrorism.’’ American Sociologist 35 (2): 5-25.
Braithwaite, A., and S. D. Johnson. 2012. ‘‘Space-Time Modelling of Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency in Iraq.’’ Journal of Quantitative Criminology 28 (1): 31-48.
Byman, D. 2006. ‘‘Do Targeted Killings Work.’’ Foreign Affairs 85:95.
Cameron, Colin A., and Previn K. Trivedi. 1998. Regression Analysis of Count Data.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Chomsky, Noam. 2002. Pirates and Emperors, Old and New: International Terrorism in the
Real World. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
Coady, C. A. J. 2004. ‘‘Terrorism, Morality, and Supreme Emergency.’’ Ethics 114 (4):
772-89.
Coogan, T. P. 2000. The IRA. New York: Palgrave.
Dalacoura, K. 2006. ‘‘Islamist Terrorism and the Middle East Democratic Deficit: Polit-
ical Exclusion, Repression and the Causes of Extremism.’’ Democratization 13 (3):
508-25.
David, Steven R. 2003. ‘‘Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing.’’ Review of Inter-
national Affairs 2 (3):138-58.
Dolnik, A., and A. Bhattacharjee. 2002. ‘‘Hamas: Suicide Bombings, Rockets, or WMD?’’
Terrorism and Political Violence 14 (3): 109-28.
Drake, C. J. M. 1991. ‘‘The Provisional IRA: A Case Study.’’ Terrorism & Political Violence
3 (2): 43-60.
Drake, C. J. M. 1998a. Terrorists’ Target Selection. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Drake, C. J. M. 1998b. ‘‘The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection.’’ Terrorism &
Political Violence 10 (2): 53.
Duyvesteyn, I. 2008. ‘‘Great Expectations: The Use of Armed Force to Combat Terrorism.’’
Small Wars & Insurgencies 19 (3): 328-51.
Earth Liberation Front. 2006. ‘‘Earth Liberation Front 2006.’’ Accessed June 1, 2006. www
.earthliberationfront.com.
Feridun, M., and M. Shahbaz. 2010. ‘‘Fighting Terrorism: Are Military Measures Effective?
Empirical Evidence from Turkey.’’ Defence and Peace Economics 21 (2): 193-205.
424 Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(3)
 at University College London on April 29, 2015jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Fielding, D., and A. Shortland. 2010. ‘‘‘An Eye for an Eye, a Tooth for a Tooth’: Political
Violence and Counter-insurgency in Egypt.’’ Journal of Peace Research 47 (4): 433-47.
Gill, P., J. Horgan, and J. Lovelace. 2011. ‘‘Improvised Explosive Devices—The Problem of
Definition.’’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34 (9): 732-48.
Goodwin, J. 2006. ‘‘A Theory of Categorical Terrorism.’’ Social Forces 84 (4): 2027-46.
Hafez, M. M., and J. M. Hatfield. 2006. ‘‘Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multi-
variate Analysis of Israel’s Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising 1.’’ Studies
in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (4): 359-82.
Helfstein, S., and D. Wright. 2011. ‘‘Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure across the Dimen-
sions of Al Qaeda.’’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34 (5): 367-82.
Hoffman, Bruce. 1999. ‘‘Terrorism Trends and Prospects.’’ In Countering the New Terrorism,
edited by Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele
Zanini, 7-38. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
Horgan, J., and M. Taylor. 1997. ‘‘The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and
Functional Structure.’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 9 (3): 1-32.
Horowitz, M.C., and P. B. K. Potter. 2011. ‘‘Allying to Kill: Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation
and the Consequences for Lethality.’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution. Accessed October 13
2013, http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/01/02/0022002712468726.abstract.
Israeli, Raphael. 2002. ‘‘A Manual of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism.’’ Terrorism-and-
Political-Violence 14 (4): 23-40.
Jackson, B. A. 2001. ‘‘Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment
Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption.’’ Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 24 (3): 183-213.
Jackson, B. A. 2009. ‘‘Understanding Why Terrorist Operations Succeed or Fail.’’ DTIC
Document. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_
OP257.pdf.
Johnson, S., and A. Braithwaite. 2009. ‘‘Spatio-Temporal Distribution of Insurgency in Iraq.’’
in J. Freilich & G. Newman (eds.), ‘Countering Terrorism through SCP.’ Crime Preven-
tion Studies 25: 9-32.
Jones, David Martin, Michael L. R. Smith, and Mark Weeding. 2003. ‘‘Looking for the
Pattern: Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia—The Genealogy of a Terror Network.’’ Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism 29 (6): 399-411.
LaFree, G., L. Dugan, and R. Korte. 2009. ‘‘The Impact of British Counterterrorist Strategies
on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models*.’’
Criminology 47 (1): 17-45.
Laqueur, W. 1998. The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Lia, Brynjar, and Thomas Hegghammer. 2004. ‘‘Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al
Qaida Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings.’’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
27 (4): 355-75.
Linke, Andrew, Frank Witmer, and John O’Loughlin. 2012. ‘‘Space-Time Granger Analysis
of the War in Iraq: A Study in Coalition and Insurgent Action-Reaction,’’ International
Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations 38:402-25.
Asal et al. 425
 at University College London on April 29, 2015jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Long, Scott J. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Long, Scott J., and Jeremy Freese. 2003. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent
Variables using Stata. Rev. ed. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
Lum, Cynthia, Leslie W. Kennedy, and Alison J. Sherley. 2006. ‘‘The Effectiveness of
Counter-terrorism Strategies.’’ A Campbell Systematic Review 2006:2, the Campbell Col-
laboration, Oslo.
McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. ‘‘Resource Mobilization and Social
Movements: A Partial Theory.’’ American Journal of Sociology 82 (6): 1212-41.
McCauley, C., and S. Moskalenko. 2008. ‘‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways
toward Terrorism.’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 20 (3): 415-33.
McCormick, G. H. 2003. ‘‘Terrorist Decision Making.’’ Political Science 6 (1): 473.
McGarry, J., and B. O’Leary. 1995. Explaining Northern Ireland. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
McKittrick, D., Thornton, C., Kelters, S., & Feeney, B. 2007. Lost lives. Edinburgh: Main-
stream Publishing.
Mitchell, C. 2005. Religion, Identity and Politics. London: Ashgate.
Moloney, E. 2003. A Secret History of the IRA. New York: W. W. Norton.
Moloney, E. 2010. Voices from the Grave: Two Men’s War in Ireland. New York: Faber and
Faber.
O’Callaghan, S. 1999. The Informer. London: Corgi Books.
Oots, Kent Layne. 1986. A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism. 141
ed. Book, Whole vols, Contributions in political science. New York: Greenwood Press.
Oppenheimer, A. R. 2009. The Bombs and the Bullets: A History of Deadly Ingenuity. Dublin:
Irish Academic Press.
Rogers, William H. 1993. ‘‘Regression Standard Errors in Clustered Samples.’’ Stata
Technical Bulletin 13:1923-28.
Ross, Jeffrey Ian. 1995. ‘‘The Rise and Fall of Quebecois Separatist Terrorism: A Qualitative
Application of Factors from Two Models.’’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 18 (4):
285-97.
Sageman, M. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Sageman, M. 2008. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Schmid, A. P. 1988. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts,
Databases, Theories, and Literature. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Schmid, A. P., and A. J. Jongman. 2005. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors,
Concepts, Databases, Theories, and Literature. 2nd ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Sharp, Gene. 1965. The Political Equivalent of War-Civilian Defense, International
Concilhtion. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Smith, M. L. R. 1997. Fighting for Ireland: The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican
Movement. London: Routledge.
Sutton, M. 1994. An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland 1969-1993. Belfast: Beyond
the Pale.
426 Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(3)
 at University College London on April 29, 2015jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Taylor, Bron. 1998. ‘‘Religion, Violence, and Radical Environmentalism: From Earth First! to
the Unabomber to the Earth Liberation Front.’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 10 (4):
10-42.
Vuong, Q. 1989. ‘‘Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-nested Hypotheses.’’
Econometrica 57 (2): 307-33.
Whine, Michael. 1999. ‘‘Islamist Organizations on the Internet.’’ Terrorism & Political
Violence 11 (9): 123-32.
White, R., and T. F. White. 1991. ‘‘Revolution in the City: On the Resources of Urban
Guerrillas.’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 3 (4): 100-32.
Zahab, Miriam Abou, and Olivier Roy. 2004. Islamist Networks. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Asal et al. 427
 at University College London on April 29, 2015jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
